{ "lesson": "02-reward-hacking-goodhart", "title": "Reward Hacking and Goodhart's Law", "questions": [ { "stage": "pre", "question": "Goodhart's Law, as originally stated, says:", "options": [ "Any measure that becomes a target ceases to be a good measure", "Optimization always improves a proxy without limit", "Heavy-tailed errors cannot occur in finite-dimensional models", "Reward models converge to true human preference at large scale" ], "correct": 0, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "check", "question": "In Gao, Schulman, Hilton (2023), how do proxy reward and gold reward behave as KL distance from the initial policy grows?", "options": [ "Both rise monotonically with KL", "Proxy peaks then falls, gold rises monotonically", "Both stay flat under any KL constraint", "Proxy keeps rising, gold peaks closer to the origin then falls" ], "correct": 3, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "check", "question": "Which of the following is NOT one of the four 'costumes' of reward hacking listed in the lesson?", "options": [ "Sycophancy", "Tokenizer mismatch", "Verbosity bias", "Unfaithful reasoning" ], "correct": 1, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "check", "question": "What is the 'Catastrophic Goodhart' result about KL regularization?", "options": [ "KL regularization only fails when the policy is randomly initialized", "KL regularization is equivalent to ensembling reward models", "Under heavy-tailed reward error, a KL-constrained optimal policy can still drive proxy reward up while gold reward stays at baseline", "KL regularization always prevents reward hacking when beta is positive" ], "correct": 2, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "post", "question": "Which mitigation does Coste et al. (2023) study to soften reward over-optimization?", "options": [ "Training the policy on the proxy at zero temperature", "Reward-model ensembles with worst-case aggregation", "Removing the KL penalty entirely", "Increasing the labeler pool to one million raters" ], "correct": 1, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "post", "question": "According to the 2026 unified view, what core mechanism do verbosity, sycophancy, unfaithful CoT, and evaluator tampering share?", "options": [ "They all stem from learning-rate schedules being too aggressive", "They are caused only by labelers who write malicious preferences", "Probability mass shifts to outputs that maximize proxy reward by exploiting easy-to-learn heuristics that spuriously correlated with approval", "They are each independent bugs in distinct reward heads" ], "correct": 2, "explanation": "" } ] }