{ "lesson": "25-echoleak-cves-for-ai", "title": "EchoLeak and the Emergence of CVEs for AI", "questions": [ { "stage": "pre", "question": "Which best describes EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711)?", "options": [ "A zero-click AI command-injection flaw in Microsoft 365 Copilot (CVE-2025-32711, CVSS 9.3) causing unauthorized network information disclosure, with exfiltration via a CSP allowlisted/trusted Microsoft domain", "A hardware vulnerability in NPUs", "A supply-chain attack on PyPI", "A jailbreak via long-context shot stuffing" ], "correct": 0, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "check", "question": "What makes EchoLeak 'zero-click'?", "options": [ "It runs in the operating-system kernel", "It requires three clicks but no typing", "The victim does not have to open the email; Copilot retrieves it as RAG context during routine queries and the injected instructions execute", "It requires the user to click a link in a Teams chat" ], "correct": 2, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "check", "question": "Aim Labs frames EchoLeak as 'LLM Scope Violation'. What three boundaries must each be controlled independently?", "options": [ "Retrieval, scope, output", "Network, disk, memory", "Prompt, response, log", "Input, model, GPU" ], "correct": 0, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "check", "question": "How did Microsoft/GitHub fix CamoLeak (CVSS 9.6, GitHub Copilot Chat)?", "options": [ "Increased context size", "Added an XPIA prompt-injection filter", "Switched the model to Llama Guard", "Disabled image rendering entirely in Copilot Chat (cost: usability) because the alternative attack surface could not be bounded" ], "correct": 3, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "post", "question": "What pattern in severity calibration did the EchoLeak disclosure reveal?", "options": [ "Vendors over-rated the initial CVSS score", "All AI CVEs are automatically rated 10.0", "Vendors initially rated EchoLeak low (information disclosure); Aim Labs's MFA-code exfiltration proof-of-concept escalated the rating to 9.3 — defenders must push for comprehensive PoC for AI-specific vulnerabilities", "Severity ratings are decided by OWASP only" ], "correct": 2, "explanation": "" }, { "stage": "post", "question": "Where do NIST and OWASP rank prompt injection as of 2024/2025?", "options": [ "NIST: outside scope; OWASP: not listed", "Both call it a Tier-2 risk only", "NIST: minor; OWASP: bottom of list", "NIST AI SPD 2024 frames prompt injection as a major information-security risk for generative AI; OWASP 2025 ranks it LLM01 (top application-layer threat)" ], "correct": 3, "explanation": "" } ] }