{
  "lesson": "30-dual-use-risk-cyber-bio-chem-nuclear",
  "title": "Dual-Use Risk - Cyber, Bio, Chem, Nuclear Uplift",
  "questions": [
    {
      "stage": "pre",
      "question": "How did the 2024-2025 bio-uplift narrative evolve?",
      "options": [
        "It stayed unchanged across 2024-2025",
        "From 'severe uplift' to 'no measurable uplift'",
        "From 'mild uplift' (2024) to 'on the cusp of meaningfully helping novices create known biological threats' (April 2025) to '2.53x uplift insufficient to rule out ASL-3' (Anthropic 2025)",
        "From 'no uplift' to 'mild uplift'"
      ],
      "correct": 2,
      "explanation": ""
    },
    {
      "stage": "check",
      "question": "What did Anthropic's November 2025 cyber threat report find?",
      "options": [
        "Frontier models refused all cyber tasks",
        "Open-source models exceeded frontier capability",
        "Chinese-linked state actors used Claude's agentic coding tool to automate 80-90% of a cyberattack campaign, with human intervention only in 4-6 steps",
        "Cyberattacks remained entirely manual"
      ],
      "correct": 2,
      "explanation": ""
    },
    {
      "stage": "check",
      "question": "How are vision-enabled frontier models eroding the chem/bio execution gap?",
      "options": [
        "By increasing context length only",
        "By replacing all lab equipment with virtual simulators",
        "By observing wet-lab video and providing real-time protocol correction; OpenAI's December 2025 demonstration showed GPT-5 iterating on wet-lab experiments at 79x efficiency improvement via AI-driven protocol optimization",
        "By generating fake protocols"
      ],
      "correct": 2,
      "explanation": ""
    },
    {
      "stage": "check",
      "question": "Why has nuclear-domain uplift remained bounded relative to bio/chem/cyber?",
      "options": [
        "Frontier models refuse to discuss physics",
        "All nuclear information has been removed from training data",
        "Nuclear is the easiest domain to attack with AI",
        "The threat model is dominated by fissile-material acquisition (a non-informational, procurement-and-equipment bottleneck), so AI uplift on the information layer provides limited novice uplift in practice"
      ],
      "correct": 3,
      "explanation": ""
    },
    {
      "stage": "post",
      "question": "What does the novice-relative vs expert-absolute asymmetry imply for safety cases?",
      "options": [
        "Addressing only novice uplift (input filters, refusals, uncertainty) is insufficient for expert-absolute control; additional measures like elicitation-hardening, capability unlearning, and control protocols are needed",
        "Both are perfectly addressed by RLHF",
        "Expert-absolute capability is automatically zero",
        "Only novice uplift matters"
      ],
      "correct": 0,
      "explanation": ""
    },
    {
      "stage": "post",
      "question": "What is OpenAI's 'trusted access' pilot in the cyber dual-use context?",
      "options": [
        "A patch for CVE-2025-32711",
        "Granting vetted security organisations (incident-response firms, government) capability access for defensive dual-use work, creating an access asymmetry that favours defenders if it scales",
        "An open-source release of GPT-5",
        "Closing all API access"
      ],
      "correct": 1,
      "explanation": ""
    }
  ]
}